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Abstract
E¤ects of direct ‡ights on trade costs are investigated using micro price data at the city
level. After controlling for local retail/distribution costs, traded input prices are obtained to
be further used in the measurement of trade costs across cities through arbitrage conditions.
The existence of a direct ‡ight enters trade costs regressions negatively and signi…cantly. The
results are shown to be robust to the consideration of many control variables, nonlinearities
in the e¤ects of distance on trade costs, possible endogeneity of having direct ‡ights between
cities and alternative de…nitions of the data. The direct ‡ights that are shown to be determined by bilateral air services agreements are further shown to reduce trade costs through an
endogeneity analysis; the main policy implications are twofold: (i) international trade policies
through aviation services, such as Open Skies Agreements of the U.S., are alternative trade
policy tools to reduce international trade barriers; (ii) direct ‡ights facilitate the integration
of internal markets as in the case of European Union.
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1

Introduction

The increase in air transportation/travel due to the technological development in
jet aircraft engines has led to the improvement of global market integration significantly since World War II. This improvement has been partly achieved by the increase in air shipment due to lower air transportation costs,1 and partly due to the
face-to-face business meetings that overcome informational asymmetries in international trade, because, as indicated by Rauch (2001), the reduction in informal trade
barriers through business and social networks is one of the key factors facilitating
trade. Therefore, there is no doubt that air transportation/travel has signi…cantly
contributed to welfare-improving globalization.
Within this picture, direct ‡ights have gained more importance, because, compared to the inconvenience of transferring ‡ights and the additional ‡ying time, direct ‡ights provide the cheapest/fastest air travel and air transportation. Regarding
the role of direct ‡ights in air travel, a direct ‡ight facilitates a business travel by
considerably reducing the journey costs, including the opportunity cost of time. By
reducing the travel time, direct ‡ights also allow business people to have face-toface meetings, expand the knowledge of alternative markets, augment their reciprocal
1

Hummels (2007) shows that by the year of 2000, air shipments were representing a third of the

value of U.S. imports and more than half of U.S. exports with countries outside North America.
Similarly, again in 2000, excluding land neighbors, the air share of import value was more than 30
percent for Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, Paraguay, and Uruguay.
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trust and thus increase the likelihood of trade.2 For example, Alderighi and Gaggero
(2012) have found that the elasticity of exports to direct ‡ights is about 10%, which
is mostly attributed to the increasing role of business traveling in maintaining and
reinforcing commercial relations; Cristea (2011) and Poole (2013) have shown that
business travel helps to overcome informational asymmetries in international trade
by generating international sales in the form of new export relationships.
Regarding the role of direct ‡ights in air transportation, Micco and Serebrisky
(2006) have shown that Open Skies Agreements (OSAs) between the U.S. and other
countries, which allow airlines to operate direct ‡ights internationally, reduce air
transport costs by 9% and increase by 7% the share of imports arriving by air. Similarly, Winston and Yan (2015) investigate OSAs from a welfare perspective and show
that they have generated at least $4 billion in annual gains to travelers. As regards
the importance of time spent in transportation, Hummels and Schaur (2013) estimate that each day in transit is equivalent to an ad-valorem tari¤ of 0.6% to 2.3%,
where due to having a direct ‡ight, the travel time between, for example, Taipei and
Shanghai is cut from more than 5 hours to around one and a half hours (see Chang
et al., 2011). Moreover, studies such as by Bel and Fageda (2008) have found that
the availability of direct ‡ights has a large in‡uence on the location of large …rms’
headquarters, which is another factor facilitating trade. Finally, studies such as by
Cristie, Hillberry and Mattoo (2014) have discussed the importance of direct ‡ights
2

See Frankel (1998), Rauch (1999), Kulendran and Wilson (2000), Frankel and Rose (2002).
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(through plurilateral air services agreements) in passenger tra¢ c, which is another
factor in the removal of informational trade barriers.
Considering the discussion so far, this paper attempts to measure the e¤ects of
direct ‡ights on trade costs between cities by introducing and using a micro price data
set on 22 traded goods at the retail level across 433 cities covering 114 countries.3 Such
a rich data set allows us to consider the e¤ects of direct ‡ights on trade costs for both
international and intranational city pairs. Trade costs are de…ned as the arbitrage
costs measured by the maximum price di¤erence between traded input prices across
cities in order to control for local retail/distribution costs. We also work with timeaveraged (long-run) data to eliminate the transitory variations in prices, such as those
due to exchange rates. The results show that the existence of direct ‡ights between
cities negatively and signi…cantly reduces trade costs. This result is robust to the
consideration of many control variables and nonlinearities in the e¤ects of distance
on trade costs.
We also consider the possible endogeneity of having direct ‡ights between cities by
investigating potential international policies. It is shown that the existence of direct
‡ights are positively a¤ected by air services agreements signed between countries. One
example is the policy of the U.S. through OSAs, the …rst of which has been signed
between the U.S. and Netherlands in 1992. According to the U.S. Department of
State, as of 2015, the U.S. currently has OSAs with more than 100 countries, and over
3

The data have been downloaded from http://www.numbeo.com/ which is the world’s largest

database of user contributed data about cities. See the data section below for more details.
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70 percent of international departures from the United States now ‡y to OSA partners.
Other examples include Multilateral Agreement on the Establishment of a European
Common Aviation Area signed by many European countries among themselves, A
Common Aviation Area Agreement and Euro-Mediterranean Aviation Agreement of
the E.U. with countries outside of Europe. Since direct ‡ights a¤ected by such policies
are further shown to reduce trade costs through a two-stage endogeneity analysis, it
is implied that international air services agreements are signi…cant policy tools for
reducing trade costs.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section uses a retail model
to measure trade costs. Section 3 depicts the details of the estimation methodology
and the data. Section 4 reveals the empirical results together with many robustness
checks. Section 5 concludes by providing policy suggestions.

2

The Measurement of Trade Costs

Data for trade costs are either non-existing, excluding informal barriers to trade, or
not covering the globe.4 Accordingly, many existing studies in the literature have considered disaggregate price information across countries to measure trade costs. The
4

Even the most detailed data sets, such as the one on the U.S. international trade (that can be

obtained from http://dataweb.usitc.gov/), exclude information on informal barriers to trade and
can at most provide data for the calculated duties and the cost of all freight, insurance, and other
charges incurred; they do not cover, for instance, trade costs due to search frictions or time to ship.
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common strategy based on international/intranational studies considers the arbitrage
condition for retail prices; i.e., consumers search for the minimum retail price and order/purchase the product from the low-price location after taking trade costs into
account. Since the largest observed price di¤erence between locations provides information about the limit that the arbitrage condition imposes, the recent literature has
estimated trade costs using inequality moments. Examples of this strategy include
the intercity price analysis study by Borraz et al. (2014) using the price data obtained by the Billion Prices Project at MIT, together with international trade studies
by Eaton and Kortum (2002), Simonovska and Waugh (2014), among many others,
in the literature.5 One problem with this strategy is that retail prices of traded goods
consist of both traded and non-traded input prices, where the latter mostly refers to
local distribution costs. Accordingly, studies such as by Crucini and Yilmazkuday
(2014) have considered arbitrage opportunities only for the traded-input prices; this
can be achieved by controlling the retail prices for the local distribution costs (as we
do in this paper). In order to be consistent with the exiting literature, we directly
follow these studies while measuring trade costs, below.
5

The estimation of inequality moments has also been achieved by Andrews, Berry and Jia (2004),

Andrews and Guggenberger (2009), Andrews and Soares (2010), Andrews and Shi (2014), Ponomareva and Tamer (2011), and Rosen (2008).
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2.1

Arbitrage Condition for Traded-Input Prices

When traded inputs of the same retail good across two locations are perfect substitutes
(e.g., 1kg of rice in a New York City wholesaler versus 1kg of rice in an Istanbul rice
wholesaler), one has to control the observed retail prices for local retail/distribution
costs. Accordingly, as in Crucini and Yilmazkuday (2014), we de…ne retail prices as
follows:
Pig = Zi (Qgi )

g

g

(Wi )1

(1)

where Pig is the retail price of good g in location i, Zi is the inverse retail productivity
in location i, Wi is the local wage in location i, Qgi is the traded-input (e.g., wholesale)
g

price of good g in location i, and

is the traded input share of good g that is common

across all locations. Log relative prices between locations i and j are implied as
follows:
pgij = zij +

g g
qij

+ (1

g

(2)

) wij

where pgij = log Pig =Pjg , qijg = log Qgi =Qgj , zij = log (Zi =Zj ) and wij = log (Wi =Wj ).
Following Crucini and Yilmazkuday (2014), for the identi…cation of qijg ’s, we follow a
two-stage approach to control for retail costs.
The …rst stage utilizes geometric mean regression (to control for any measurement
errors) on the available data for relative prices and relative wages to estimate the
following expression:
pgij
|{z}

Relative Price Data

= (1

g

)

wij
|{z}

+

Wage Data
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p0g
ij
|{z}

Relative Prices Controlled for Local Wages

where, according to Equation 2, residuals of p0g
ij = zij +

g g
qij

represent relative prices

controlled for local wages; we also obtain an estimated value for

g

by this estima-

tion.6 In this …rst stage, we assume that wages are orthogonal to retail productivities
and traded-input prices. It is implied that zij ’s measure the part of the local retail
costs that cannot be measured by wages, such as infrastructure or location-speci…c
markups.
The second stage uses the relative prices controlled for local wages to estimate the
following expression:
p0g
ij
|{z}

=

Relative Prices Controlled for Local Wages

zij
|{z}

g

+

Fixed E¤ects

qijg
|{z}

Relative Traded-Input Prices

where …xed e¤ects (i.e., zij ’s) are orthogonal to relative traded-input prices (i.e., qijg ’s)
by construction. Once

g g
qij ’s

are obtained as residuals, using

g

’s estimated in the

…rst stage, we identify the traded input prices qijg ’s.
The traded input prices qijg ’s are subject to arbitrage after controlling for trade
costs. More speci…cally, the arbitrage condition for traded input prices of good g
between locations i and j is given by :
qijg = qig
where

ji

qjg

log

ij

(3)

represents the gross multiplicative trade/arbitrage costs from location j

to location i. According to this arbitrage condition, it must be the case that the
traded-input prices in location i is lower than the traded-input prices in location j
6

The estimated values of

g

’s at the good level are provided in Online Appendix tables.
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plus trade costs; otherwise, the product would have been imported from location j
until this condition would hold with inequality one more time. The interesting point
is that this condition is bilateral, because the story holds for the potential imports of
location j from location i; hence, we can also write:
g
qji
= qjg

qig

log

(4)

ij

where we have considered symmetric trade costs due to

ij

=

ji .

The last two

arbitrage conditions can be combined as follows:
qig

qjg

log

ij

(5)

where j j is the absolute value operator. When the maximum (i.e., the upper bound)
of the left hand side is considered as the maximum traded-input price di¤erence across
goods between locations i and j, the last inequality turns into an equality as follows:
log

ij

= max
g

qig

qjg

(6)

which we use as our measure of trade/arbitrage costs.
It is important to emphasize that our trade cost de…nition is broad enough to
capture any transportation costs and international border related costs as well as
any information frictions. Since we control for local retail/distribution costs, our
de…nition of trade costs is slightly di¤erent from studies such as by Anderson and
van Wincoop (2004) who have a broader de…nition of trade costs as capturing even
distribution costs. Other related studies such as by Allen (2014) have distinguished
8

between transportation costs and information frictions; in the absence of an international border, while the case of complete information in Allen (2014) implies that

ij

in this paper corresponds to transportation costs (i.e., no information frictions), the
case of incomplete information implies that

ij

captures both transportation costs

and information frictions. Since we are interested in investigating the e¤ects of direct ‡ights on informational trade barriers, our analysis corresponds to the case of
incomplete information by keeping information frictions as a part of the trade costs.

3

Empirical Methodology and Data

Once trade costs are obtained (as described in the previous subsection), we are interested in …nding the e¤ects of having direct ‡ights between cities. Accordingly, we
consider the following regression investigating the trade costs between cities i and j:
log

ij

=

0

+

1 fij

+

2

log dij +

3 bij

+

X

k
3+k xij

(7)

k

where fij is a dummy variable taking a value of 1 if there is any direct ‡ight between
cities i and j, dij is the great circle distance in miles between cities i and j, bij is a
dummy variable taking a value of 1 when there is an international border between
cities i and j, and …nally xkij ’s represent a set of control variables including city
…xed e¤ects (capturing any city characteristics such as its size, geographical location,
being on a coast, etc.) as well as variables at the bilateral country level (i.e., control
variables that are common across city pairs located in two speci…c countries) that are

9

standard in international studies, including having a common land border, language,
colony or regional trade agreement (RTA).7
Micro price data include observations of 22 traded goods at the retail level obtained from 433 cities (covering 114 countries) for the years between 2010 and 2014.8
The complete lists of goods and cities are given in Online Appendix tables, while the
coverage of cities are depicted on the world map in Figure 1, where we have multiple cities from many countries. The data also include "Average Monthly Disposable
Salary (After Tax)" which we accept as our wage data. The data have been downloaded from http://www.numbeo.com/ which is the world’s largest database of user
contributed data about cities. Users of Numbeo can enter the micro prices that they
observe either at the good level or by using the price collection sheet provided by
the web page. Since the price data are user contributed, Numbeo uses alternative
methodologies to …lter out noise data. First, the user provided data are checked for
outliers manually.9 Second, one quarter of lowest and highest inputs are discarded as
7

While a common land border refers to city pairs that are located in neighbor countries (through

a land border), an international border refers to city pairs located in di¤erent countries that do
not necessarily share a land border. All of the country-level control variables are set equal to 1 for
intranational city pairs. It is important to emphasize that such a strategy does not a¤ect anything
in the regression results, because the e¤ects of having an international border is already controlled
by bij .
8

Although the original data set includes 49 retail goods, we ignored the goods that are non-traded

in our investigation, since such goods may not be subject to arbitrage opportunities due to trade.
9

For example, for a particular price in a city, when values contributed are 5, 6, 20, and 4 in a

reasonable time span, the value of 20 is discarded as a noise.
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borderline cases. Third, Numbeo uses heuristic technology that discards data which
most likely are incorrect statistically.
Using the model-implied traded-input prices, we calculate log trade costs according
to the following version of Equation 6 in the long run:
log

ij

= max
g

qig

qjg

= max
g

P

t

g
qi;t
T

g
qj;t

!

(8)

where, as indicated in Table 1, the number of city pairs is 90,743 (= 10; 676 + 80; 067),
and number of international city pairs are much higher than the number of intranational city pairs. The use of time-averaged data is designed to eliminate the transitory
variations in prices, such as the ones due to exchange rates. As is evident in Table 1,
on average, trade costs between international city pairs (i.e., city pairs having an international border) are about 50% higher compared to intranational city pairs (i.e., city
pairs within a country). Compared to the existing literature based on international
trade costs, the magnitude of trade costs in this paper are relatively lower. In particular, based on earlier and di¤erent data sets, Anderson and van Wincoop (2004) have
estimated international trade costs about 170% (ad-valorem tax equivalent), while
the implied international trade costs in Eaton and Kortum (2002) are about %190;
nevertheless, it is important to emphasize that these values in the literature are not
fully comparable to the values in this paper, since they are at the country level, and
they have not been controlled for local retail/distribution costs. The results in this
paper regarding the size of intranational trade costs are in line with studies such as
by Allen (2014) who, by using a smaller set of goods within Philippines, has recently
11

estimated ad-valorem tax equivalent trade costs as ranging between 47% and 101%,
where the former represents pure transportation costs, while the latter represents the
summation of transportation costs and information frictions.
The data for direct ‡ights have been obtained from Airline Route Mapper for the
year 2013. The data include information on 63,149 direct ‡ights from around the
world where the name of the airlines and airports are also provided. Considering the
provided airport codes and names, we determined the exact location of the airports
(in terms of their latitudes and longitudes) and the countries in which they are located
by using Google Maps.
By using Google Maps, we also calculated the exact location of cities in our price
data (in terms of their latitudes and longitudes). Considering these locations, we
calculated the great circle distance between them in miles to be used in the regression
analysis (see Table 1). Furthermore, in order to determine whether there is a direct
‡ight between any two cities in our price data, we searched for the airports within 50
miles of the city centers by using the airport location data we have. We found that
for some cities, there are no airports within 50 miles, while for some others, there are
more than one airport; summary statistics are provided in Table 1 where the number
of city pairs with direct ‡ights is 10,676 (out of 90,743). For a given city pair for
which prices are compared, we produced the binary variable of having direct ‡ights
(using the direct ‡ight data that we have) by taking into account all airports within
50 miles of the analyzed cities.

12

As shown in Table 1, when all city pairs in the sample are considered, the average
trade costs are about %111:5 for city pairs with at least one direct ‡ight, while they
are about %136:6 for city pairs without any direct ‡ights. Therefore, without any
other controls, trade costs are about 25% lower for city pairs with at least one direct
‡ight. Similar comparisons can be made for international and intranational city pairs
as well, where city pairs with at least one direct ‡ight have lower trade costs in
both cases. Regarding the distribution of trade costs, the Kernel density estimates
are given in Figure 2, where the city pairs that have direct ‡ights between each other
have lower trade costs, independent of being international or intranational. Therefore,
direct ‡ights seem to have a reducing e¤ect on trade costs between cities; nevertheless,
proving this claim requires a formal investigation, the results of which are depicted
in the next section.
We estimate Equation 7 with alternative combinations of the right hand side
variables using OLS as the benchmark case. However, existence of a direct ‡ight
between any two cities may be endogenously determined by trade costs. Accordingly,
besides the benchmark case, we also consider an IV estimation (of Two-Stage Least
Squares, TSLS) to control for endogeneity. In the …rst stage, the existence of a direct
‡ight is regressed on policy-based instruments by a linear probability model, and
the …tted values of the …rst stage are used to estimate Equation 7 in the second
stage.10 Using policy-based instruments is the key here in order to make sure that
10

Needless to say, exogenous variables in Equation 7 (e.g., distance, border, language, colony, RTA,

city …xed e¤ects) are included in both stages. We also consider two-way clustered standard errors
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the corresponding policy suggestions will be relevant for governments regarding their
international policies.
We consider four di¤erent sets of instruments in the …rst stage estimation that are
depicted in Table 2. The instrument sets consist of …ve policy variables at the country
level that are borrowed from Piermartini and Rousova (2013) who use a large data set
of approximately 2,300 air services agreements that were in force in 2005 among 184
countries. The timing of this data set perfectly matches the purpose of this paper,
since these instruments represent the initial conditions of countries, about …ve years
before the collection of data on trade costs. The …rst policy instrument is the Air
Liberalization Index (ALI) constructed by the WTO Secretariat (WTO 2006). It is
an expert-based index that measures how liberal the aviation agreements are between
countries; it considers the main features of air services agreements between countries
by assigning a weight to each provision included in the agreement, such as grant of
rights, capacity clause, pricing, withholding, designation, statistics and cooperative
arrangements. ALI ranges between 0 and 50, where 0 is associated with the most
restrictive agreement and 50 denotes the most liberal agreement across countries.
Factor Analysis Index (FAI) is another instrument introduced by Piermartini and
Rousova (2013) that has been obtained by means of factor analysis using the same
similar indicators with alternative weights; FAI ranges between zero and one, and
it increases with the degree of liberalization of the aviation market. Log E¤ective
at the city level that have been modi…ed to control for biases due to having a two-stage estimator.

14

Years (LEY) represent the number of years since the …rst air services agreements
have entered into force, capturing the historical links between two countries in terms
of cooperation in aviation matters. Incident Investigation Procedures (IIP) in air
services agreements is a dummy variable for incident investigation that equals 1 if
investigation procedures in the event of an accident or forced landing by an aircraft
of one party in the territory of the other are covered by an air services agreement.
Security Cooperation Provision (SCP) in air services agreements is another dummy
variable for security cooperation taking a value of 1 if a provision is made for cooperation in situations involving aviation security, including actions taken to prevent,
suppress, or terminate threats or acts of unlawful interference. The reader is referred
to Piermartini and Rousova (2013) for further details of these policy instruments.
Since ALI and FAI are substitute indices for each other, we use alternative combination of these four variables to construct our set of instruments as depicted in Table
2.

4
4.1

Empirical Results
Benchmark Case

The benchmark case results based on OLS are given in Table 3, where the e¤ects
of direct ‡ights on trade costs are negative and signi…cant (at the 0.1% level), in-

15

dependent of including the control variables.11 As is evident in column 5, which is
the case with all control variables includes to avoid any omitted variable bias, the
existence of a direct ‡ight reduces trade costs by about 1.32% across cities. This is
much lower compared to Micco and Serebrisky (2006) who have shown that Open
Skies Agreements between countries reduce air transport costs by 9%; however, note
that we only focus on the e¤ect of direct ‡ights, while they focus on both direct and
indirect ‡ights potentially taking e¤ect due the international agreements.
The e¤ect of distance on trade costs is positive, as expected, where the coe¢ cient
estimate takes a value of about 0.05. This estimate corresponds to about 36% of
trade costs when the distance between cities is about 1000 miles; it is also consistent
with existing studies in the literature such as by Crucini and Yilmazkuday (2014).
Nevertheless, there may be nonlinearities in the e¤ect of distance on trade costs; we
will consider such possibilities during the robustness checks, below.
Having an international border between cities also contributes to trade costs with
an additional e¤ect of about %15 percent. Therefore, direct ‡ights have an additional
reduction impact on international trade costs compared to intranational trade costs.
Regarding other international e¤ects, having a common border (between the countries
where cities are located) reduces trade costs by about 11%, while having a common
language (between the countries where cities are located) reduces trade costs by about
11

Since trade costs are at the city-pair level, cluster-robust standard errors are calculated at the

city level; such a strategy has been used to control for within-city-pair cross-city correlation in the
regression analyis.
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13%. Having a colonial relationship (between the countries where cities are located)
also reduces trade costs between cities by about 4%, and …nally having an RTA
reduces trade costs by about 13%. Having a high explanatory power further supports
these results.

4.2

Robustness Checks

As the …rst robustness check, we consider nonlinearities in the e¤ect of distance on
trade costs; the results are given in Table 4. While the …rst column replicates the last
column of Table 3 for comparison purposes, the second column considers log distance
squared, and the remaining columns investigate the e¤ects of distance considering
…ve distance intervals de…ned as the …rst to …fth 20th percentile of the distance data.
As is evident, both log distance and log distance squared are signi…cant in the second
column; hence, there is evidence for nonlinearity in the e¤ects of distance on trade
costs. This is also supported by the e¤ects of log distance intervals in columns (3)(6). The existence of a direct ‡ight, which is the main focus of this paper, still
has negative e¤ects on trade costs in all columns, and its coe¢ cient is signi…cant
in all columns except for column (2). Therefore, there is still strong evidence for
the negative e¤ects of having direct ‡ights on trade costs between cities, even after
considering for nonlinearities in distance measures.
As the second robustness check, we consider the potential endogeneity of having
direct ‡ights between cities. As discussed in details above, this consists of a two-

17

stage estimation, where the existence of a direct ‡ight is investigated in the …rst
stage through a linear probability model, and the …tted values of this …rst stage are
further used in the second stage to determine the e¤ects of direct ‡ights on trade costs.
The results of the …rst stage are given in Table 5, where we have (for sure) included
the exogenous variables of the second stage analysis as well, including nonlinearities
in distance. Each column represents a di¤erent set of instruments as de…ned in Table
2. Before moving to the details of the results, it is important to emphasize that the
considered instruments are relevant according to the F-test results in Table 5 showing
the signi…cance level of the instrument-relevance test results based on the joint null
hypothesis of the coe¢ cients of instruments being equal to zero.
Regarding the results, both Air Liberalization Index (ALI) and Factor Analysis
Index (FAI) a¤ect the existence of a direct ‡ight positively. Therefore, if two cities
are located in two countries having an aviation agreement, it is more likely for these
cities to have a direct ‡ight between each other. Log E¤ective Years (LEY) also
enter positively and signi…cantly to the …rst stage estimation, meaning that as the
number of years for having an aviation agreement increases, the chances for the cities
located in these countries to have a direct ‡ight also increases. Similarly, both Incident Investigation Procedures (IIP) and Security Cooperation Provision (SCP) in air
services agreements have positive e¤ects on the existence of a direct ‡ight; i.e., if two
countries have such details in their agreement, there is a bigger chance that there will
be a direct ‡ight between the cities located in these countries.

18

When we investigate the e¤ects of standard gravity variables on the existence of
a direct ‡ight in Table 5, it is evident that log distance enters the linear probability
regression positively and signi…cantly, while its squared value enters negatively and
signi…cantly. Therefore, direct ‡ights are more available between cities that are remote from each other, but as distance increases between cities, there are fewer direct
‡ights. This is potentially because of having longer ‡ights as the distance increases between cities, which makes it economically less pro…table due to having fewer demand
between such cities; instead, indirect ‡ights through connection hubs may be more
preferable in such cases. Having an international border between cities also decreases
the chances of having a direct ‡ight between cities, meaning that direct ‡ights are
more common across intranational city pairs. Having a common/land border across
countries where two cities are located also reduces the likelihood of having a direct
‡ight, potentially due to having easy access to other modes of transportation through
that border (e.g., European countries that have a common border). Having a common language also increases the possibility of having direct ‡ights. Finally, having
a common language, a colonial relationship or a regional trade agreement also enter
positively and signi…cantly in most cases. High explanatory power in the regressions
support these results.
The …tted values of the …rst stage regressions, which represent direct ‡ights determined by policy instruments based on air services agreements, are further used to
investigate the e¤ects of direct ‡ights on trade costs. The results are given in Table
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6, where the null hypothesis of the existence of a direct ‡ight being exogenous is
rejected at the 10% level for Instrument Set #1 and at the 1% level for other set of
instruments. As is evident, the e¤ects of direct ‡ights are negative and signi…cant
in all IV (TSLS) results, independent of the set of instruments used, although the
magnitude of the negative e¤ect changes across instrument sets.

4.3

Further Robustness

Information frictions have been shown to be higher internationally compared to intranationally (e.g., see Hau, 2001). Accordingly, we would like to know whether the
existence of a direct ‡ight a¤ects trade costs di¤erently when we consider international versus intranational city pairs. The corresponding results are given in Table
7, where the results based on the interaction of the direct ‡ight and an international
border are shown. As is evident, international direct ‡ights correspond to lower trade
costs independent of the instruments used; however, the corresponding evidence on
the e¤ect of intranational direct ‡ights are mixed. It is implied that our results of
direct ‡ights corresponding to lower trade costs are mostly derived by international
rather than intranational direct ‡ights. Therefore, the results are in line with the
existing literature based on higher international information barriers.
Although we consider city …xed e¤ects in almost all of our regressions in order to
capture city-speci…c characteristics such as size and geographical location, for robustness, we also consider an alternative city-pair dummy variable which takes a value of
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1 when both cities are coastal cities.12 We are particularly interested in the interaction of this dummy variable with the existence of a direct ‡ight in order to test the
hypothesis of whether direct ‡ights have a di¤erent impact for coastal city pairs, since
such city pairs may have lower trade costs between each other. As is evident in Table
7, the corresponding results are mixed (i.e., they depend on the set of instruments
used), suggesting that direct ‡ights do not necessarily a¤ect coastal city pairs in a
di¤erent way, after controlling for city …xed e¤ects.
Finally, as mentioned by Eaton and Kortum (2002) and Borraz et al. (2014), the
maximum price di¤erence across goods is sensitive to the possibility of measurement
errors in the price data. For example, prices may be misreported or posted outside
the no-arbitrage range. Accordingly, Eaton and Kortum (2002) have considered the
second maximum price di¤erence across goods, while Borraz et al. (2014) have considered alternative percentiles (e.g., 80th, 90th, etc.). Following these studies, besides
Equation 6, for robustness, we also considered the second maximum, together with
the 80th and 90th percentiles, of traded-input price di¤erences across goods between
cities as the measure of trade costs. Furthermore, we also considered alternative
airport locations such as within 100 and 200 miles of city centers. All of these investigations resulted in virtually the same result: having direct ‡ights a¤ects trade costs
12

Coastal cities are de…ned as cities that are at most 50 miles away from the closest shoreline. Such

calculations are achieved in Matlab using the exact location of cities (in terms of their latitudes and
longitudes) and the global self-consistent hierarchical high-resolution shoreline data of gshhs_f.b.gz.
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negatively and signi…cantly.13

5

Concluding Remarks and Policy Implications

The e¤ects of direct ‡ights on trade costs are shown to be negative and signi…cant
across cities around the world. This result is supported by many robustness checks,
including the consideration of control variables, nonlinearities in the e¤ects of distance on trade costs, potential endogeneity of having direct ‡ights between cities,
and alternative de…nitions of the data. Since air services agreements signed between
countries are shown to be e¤ective on the existence of direct ‡ights, there is strong
evidence in favor of such policies that facilitate direct ‡ights and thus reduce trade
costs.
In terms of the development of trade costs over time, the literature on economic
history has shown that the technological developments in ocean transportation were
important determinants of growing trade in the …rst era of globalization during the latter half of the nineteenth century. Hummels (2007) has argued that the technological
development in air transportation (due to the declining cost of rapid transportation)
has been a critical input into a second era of globalization during the latter half of
the twentieth century. Therefore, the existing literature has restricted the reasons
for globalization to the analysis of technology, which is not directly connected to international government policies. In contrast, this paper suggests that globalization
13

The results of these robustness checks are available upon request.
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(measured by the reduction in trade costs) can also be achieved through air services
liberalization across countries that has direct connections to international government
policies. Hence, one policy implication of this paper is that tari¤ rates and/or duties
are not the only trade policy tools that can be used to lower trade costs in order
to facilitate welfare increasing economic interaction between countries; other international trade policies through aviation services, such as Open Skies Agreements of
the U.S. or A Common Aviation Area Agreement and Euro-Mediterranean Aviation
Agreement of the E.U., are also e¤ective in reducing international trade costs.
Another policy implication is that direct ‡ights facilitate the integration of internal
markets. This is in line with studies such as by Engel and Rogers (2004) who discuss
trade costs among the types of friction providing signi…cant barriers to the integration
of product markets, which has been the major conclusion of many researchers in the
literature investigating the price di¤erences across locations for several decades. This
paper has contributed to that literature by showing that trade costs can be reduced
through direct ‡ights even within the same internal market; e.g., Multilateral Agreement on the Establishment of a European Common Aviation Area signed by many
European countries among themselves to facilitate the integration of their internal
markets is a perfect example to this case.
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Figure 1 - Cities in the Micro Price Data

Notes: Each star represents a city in the micro price data. There are 433 cities in the sample.

Figure 2 - Kernel Density of Trade Costs across Cities

All City Pairs

International City Pairs

Intranational City Pairs

Notes: For any given city pair, the trade costs are measured by the maximum of the absolute log price difference across
goods. City pairs with direct flights are defined as the pairs that have direct flights between each other through an airport
within 50 miles of the center city. The left panel shows the kernel estimation of the probability density function (pdf),
while the right panel shows the kernel estimation of the cumulative density function (cdf). The sample size is 90,743.

Table 1 - Descriptive Statistics

All City Pairs

International City Pairs

Intranational City Pairs

Average Estimated Trade Costs between
City Pairs with Direct Flights

1.115

1.198

0.724

Average Estimated Trade Costs between
City Pairs without Direct Flights

1.366

1.376

0.833

Number of City Pairs with Direct Flights

10,676

8,818

1,858

Number of City Pairs without Direct Flights

80,067

78,489

1,578

Average Distance in Miles between
City Pairs with Direct Flights

1,913

2,138

845

Average Distance in Miles between
City Pairs without Direct Flights

4,897

4,973

1,134

Source: International city pairs are defined as the pairs that have an international border between them. Intranational city pairs are defined as the pairs that are
located in the same country. The availability of the price data has been determined by considering the long-run relative prices between 2010-2014. The availability
of the direct flights has been determined according to the data for 2013. Average Estimated Trade Costs represent the mean values of the estimated distributions
given in Figure 2.

Table 2 - Policy Instruments for Direct Flights

Instrument Set #1

Instrument Set #2

Instrument Set #3

Instrument Set #4

Air Liberalization Index (ALI)

YES

NO

YES

NO

Factor Analysis Index (FAI)

NO

YES

NO

YES

Log Effective Years (LEY)
of an Air Services Agreements

NO

NO

YES

YES

Incident Investigation Procedures (IIP)
in Air Services Agreements

NO

NO

YES

YES

Security Cooperation Provision (SCP)
in Air Services Agreements

NO

NO

YES

YES

Notes: ALI ranges between 0 and 50, where 0 is associated with the most restrictive agreement and 50 denotes the most liberal agreement. FAI ranges between 0
and 1; it increases with the degree of liberalization of the aviation market. IIP is a dummy variable for incident investigation that equals 1 if investigation
procedures in the event of an accident or forced landing by an aircraft of one party in the territory of the other are covered by an air services agreement. SCP is
another dummy variable for security cooperation taking a value of 1 if a provision is made for cooperation in situations involving aviation security, including
actions taken to prevent, suppress, or terminate threats or acts of unlawful interference. See Piermartini and Rousova (2013) for further details.

Table 3 - Benchmark Estimation Results for Trade Costs
Dependent Variable: Log Trade Costs

Direct Flight

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

OLS

OLS

OLS

OLS

OLS

-0.250***

-0.254***

-0.0720***

-0.0416***

-0.0132***

(0.00626)

(0.00412)

(0.00694)

(0.00406)

(0.00395)

0.105***

0.126***

0.0514***

(0.00251)

(0.00173)

(0.00255)

0.366***

0.326***

0.151***

(0.00776)

(0.00708)

(0.00817)

Log Distance

International Border

Common Border

-0.108***
(0.00606)

Common Language

-0.133***
(0.00431)

Colony

-0.0417***
(0.00475)

RTA

-0.134***
(0.00436)

City Fixed Effects

NO

YES

NO

YES

YES

Adjusted R-squared

0.016

0.744

0.058

0.782

0.795

Sample Size

90,743

90,743

90,743

90,743

57,963

Notes: ***, ** and * represent significance at the 0.1%, 1%, and 5% levels. The estimation is by OLS in all columns.
Cluster-robust standard errors calculated at the city level are in parentheses.

Table 4 - Estimation Results for Trade Costs: Nonlinearities in Distance Measures
Dependent Variable: Log Trade Costs
(1)
OLS

(2)
OLS

(3)
OLS

(4)
OLS

(5)
OLS

(6)
OLS

Direct Flight

-0.0132***
(0.00395)

-0.00587
(0.00390)

-0.0629***
(0.00686)

-0.0332***
(0.00400)

-0.0462***
(0.00680)

-0.00810*
(0.00394)

Log Distance

0.0514***

-0.0900***

(0.00255)

(0.0144)

0.0745***

0.0862***

0.0369***

0.0203***

(0.00680)

(0.00377)

(0.00738)

(0.00380)

0.109***

0.0999***

0.0592***

0.0273***

(0.00556)

(0.00327)

(0.00604)

(0.00336)

0.0864***

0.1000***

0.0351***

0.0273***

(0.00529)

(0.00304)

(0.00582)

(0.00323)

0.0930***

0.103***

0.0460***

0.0354***

(0.00515)

(0.00296)

(0.00565)

(0.00313)

0.0847***

0.0924***

0.0554***

0.0272***

(0.00493)

(0.00289)

(0.00546)

(0.00308)

Log Distance Squared

0.00997***
(0.00100)

Log Distance Interval #1
Log Distance Interval #2
Log Distance Interval #3
Log Distance Interval #4
Log Distance Interval #5
International Border

0.151***

0.161***

0.357***

0.343***

0.0103

0.166***

(0.00817)

(0.00805)

(0.00785)

(0.00708)

(0.0115)

(0.00818)

-0.108***

-0.105***

-0.0234**

-0.120***

(0.00606)

(0.00601)

(0.00880)

(0.00611)

-0.133***

-0.142***

-0.220***

-0.128***

(0.00431)

(0.00441)

(0.00578)

(0.00463)

-0.0417***

-0.0364***

-0.0439***

-0.0413***

(0.00475)

(0.00468)

(0.00928)

(0.00492)

-0.134***

-0.124***

-0.230***

-0.123***

(0.00436)

(0.00443)

(0.00800)

(0.00458)

City Fixed Effects

YES

YES

NO

YES

NO

YES

Adjusted R-squared

0.795

0.795

0.076

0.788

0.155

0.795

Sample Size

57,963

57,963

90,743

90,743

57,963

57,963

Common Border
Common Language
Colony
RTA

Notes: ***, ** and * represent significance at the 0.1%, 1%, and 5% levels. Log Distance Intervals #1-5 correspond to the
first-fifth 20th percentile of the distance measures in order to consider possible nonlinearities. The estimation is by OLS in
all columns. Cluster-robust standard errors calculated at the city level are in parentheses.

Table 5 - Estimation Results for the Existence of a Direct Flight
Dependent Variable: Existence of a Direct Flight
(1)
LPR
Instrument Set #1
ALI

(2)
LPR
Instrument Set #2

0.00242***

0.00169***

(0.000157)

(0.000175)

FAI

(4)
LPR
Instrument Set #4

0.0731***

0.0447***

(0.00680)

(0.00749)

LEY
IIP
SCP
Log Distance

(3)
LPR
Instrument Set #3

0.0157***

0.0149***

(0.00202)

(0.00203)

0.0553***

0.0683***

(0.00586)

(0.00569)

0.0291***

0.0336***

(0.00396)

(0.00397)

0.465***

0.453***

0.473***

0.466***

(0.0234)

(0.0233)

(0.0233)

(0.0232)

-0.0412***

-0.0405***

-0.0414***

-0.0409***

(0.00155)

(0.00154)

(0.00154)

(0.00153)

-0.155***

-0.178***

-0.165***

-0.173***

(0.0115)

(0.0113)

(0.0127)

(0.0126)

-0.0711***

-0.0766***

-0.0547***

-0.0554***

(0.00771)

(0.00770)

(0.00781)

(0.00782)

0.0486***

0.0476***

0.0369***

0.0349***

(0.00501)

(0.00506)

(0.00514)

(0.00516)

0.00694

0.00305

0.0112+

0.00924

(0.00618)

(0.00618)

(0.00620)

(0.00620)

0.0152***

0.0297***

-0.000912

0.00497

(0.00456)

(0.00445)

(0.00471)

(0.00467)

City Fixed Effects

YES

YES

YES

YES

Adjusted R-squared

0.427

0.426

0.429

0.429

F-test (Relevance)

240.894

116.942

91.109

80.614

[0.000]

[0.000]

[0.000]

[0.000]

57,963

57,963

57,963

57,963

Log Distance Squared
International Border
Common Border
Common Language
Colony
RTA

Sample Size

Notes: ***, ** and * represent significance at the 0.1%, 1%, and 5% levels. The estimation is by linear probability
regression (LPR) in all columns; instruments are defined in Table 2. Cluster-robust standard errors calculated at the city
level are in parentheses. F-test (Relevance) shows the instrument-relevance test results based on the joint null hypothesis
of the coefficients of instruments being equal to zero; the corresponding p-values are given in brackets.

Table 6 - Two-Step Estimation Results for Trade Costs
Dependent Variable: Log Trade Costs
(1)
IV
Instrument Set #1

(2)
IV
Instrument Set #2

(3)
IV
Instrument Set #3

(4)
IV
Instrument Set #4

Direct Flight

-0.117+
(0.0611)

-0.523***
(0.103)

-0.415***
(0.0505)

-0.518***
(0.0567)

Log Distance

-0.0420

0.133**

0.0866**

0.131***

(0.0299)

(0.0475)

(0.0265)

(0.0291)

0.00559*

-0.0104*

-0.00612**

-0.0102***

(0.00261)

(0.00423)

(0.00224)

(0.00247)

0.138***

0.0556*

0.0776***

0.0567***

(0.0145)

(0.0225)

(0.0135)

(0.0148)

-0.114***

-0.145***

-0.137***

-0.145***

(0.00776)

(0.0109)

(0.00792)

(0.00850)

-0.138***

-0.121***

-0.125***

-0.121***

(0.00506)

(0.00654)

(0.00530)

(0.00562)

-0.0364***

-0.0365***

-0.0365***

-0.0365***

(0.00470)

(0.00556)

(0.00523)

(0.00555)

-0.119***

-0.102***

-0.107***

-0.102***

(0.00508)

(0.00645)

(0.00525)

(0.00552)

City Fixed Effects

YES

YES

YES

YES

Adjusted R-squared

0. 792

0. 730

0. 754

0.731

F-test (Endogeneity)

3.370

32.545

79.625

108.688

[0.066]

[0.000]

[0.000]

[0.000]

57,963

57,963

57,963

57,963

Log Distance Squared

International Border

Common Border

Common Language

Colony

RTA

Sample Size

Notes: ***, ** and * represent significance at the 0.1%, 1%, and 5% levels. The estimation is by IV (TSLS). Instrument
Set #1-4 correspond to instrumenting the existence of Direct Flights with policy instruments defined in Table 2. Clusterrobust standard errors calculated at the city level are in parentheses. F-test (Endogeneity) shows the regression-based
endogeneity test results based on the null hypothesis of the existence of a direct flight being exogenous; the corresponding
p-values are given in brackets.

Table 7 - Two-Step Estimation Results for Trade Costs: Additional Variables

(1)
IV
Instrument Set #3

Dependent Variable: Log Trade Costs
(2)
(3)
IV
IV
Instrument Set #4
Instrument Set #3

Direct Flight
International Direct Flight
Intranational Direct Flight

-0.887***
(0.131)
-0.782***
(0.120)
1.239**
(0.462)

Log Distance Squared
International Border
Common Border
Common Language
Colony
RTA
City Fixed Effects
Adjusted R-squared
F-test (Endogeneity)
Sample Size

-0.0335
(0.0500)
-0.000119
(0.00347)
1.113***
(0.285)
-0.136***
(0.0105)
-0.117***
(0.00769)
-0.0385***
(0.00691)
-0.0655***
(0.0128)
YES
0.584
52.409
[0.000]
57,963

0.121***
(0.0354)
-0.00969***
(0.00266)
0.145
(0.194)
-0.145***
(0.00860)
-0.121***
(0.00608)
-0.0367***
(0.00565)
-0.0989***
(0.00975)
YES
0.728
54.247
[0.000]
57,963

1.649***
(0.388)
0.237***
(0.0504)
-0.0163***
(0.00386)
0.00666
(0.0257)
-0.122***
(0.0122)
-0.108***
(0.00867)
-0.0320***
(0.00800)
-0.121***
(0.00746)
YES
0.536
56.960
[0.000]
57,963

(5)
IV
Instrument Set #3

(6)
IV
Instrument Set #4

-1.031***
(0.147)
0.291
(0.554)

-0.599***
(0.113)
-0.646
(0.477)

1.313**
(0.411)
0.128+
(0.0703)
-0.0103*
(0.00469)
0.698*
(0.317)
-0.124***
(0.0121)
-0.106***
(0.00871)
-0.0343***
(0.00793)
-0.0910***
(0.0152)
YES
0.556
41.285
[0.000]
57,963

0.359
(0.469)
0.161**
(0.0622)
-0.0120**
(0.00396)
0.0201
(0.259)
-0.140***
(0.0103)
-0.118***
(0.00669)
-0.0355***
(0.00585)
-0.107***
(0.0143)
YES
0.726
36.335
[0.000]
57,963

-0.601***
(0.110)

-0.550***
(0.0931)
-0.377
(0.312)

CoastalPair*DirectFlight
Log Distance

(4)
IV
Instrument Set #4

0.332
(0.375)
0.156***
(0.0405)
-0.0117***
(0.00305)
0.0448*
(0.0202)
-0.141***
(0.00976)
-0.118***
(0.00670)
-0.0356***
(0.00567)
-0.106***
(0.00657)
YES
0.727
54.589
[0.000]
57,963

Notes: ***, ** and * represent significance at the 0.1%, 1%, and 5% levels. The estimation is by IV (TSLS). Instrument Set #3-4 correspond to instrumenting the existence of Direct Flights with
policy instruments defined in Table 2. Cluster-robust standard errors calculated at the city level are in parentheses. F-test (Endogeneity) shows the regression-based endogeneity test results based on
the null hypothesis of the existence of a direct flight being exogenous; the corresponding p-values are given in brackets.
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Table A.1 - Traded Goods in the Micro Price Data
Good Code
1

Traded Goods
Imported Beer (0.33 liter bottle)

Traded-Input Share
0.45

2

Coke/Pepsi (0.33 liter bottle)

0.26

3

Water (0.33 liter bottle)

0.14

4

Milk (regular), (1 liter)

0.61

5

Eggs (12)

0.49

6

Water (1.5 liter bottle)

0.33

7

Bottle of Wine (Mid-Range)

0.42

8

Imported Beer (0.33 liter bottle)

0.50

9

Pack of Cigarettes (Marlboro)

0.20

10

Chicken Breasts (Boneless, Skinless), (1kg)

0.43

11

Gasoline (1 liter)

0.40

12

Volkswagen Golf 1.4 90 KW Trendline (Or Equivalent New Car)

0.49

13

1 Pair of Jeans (Levis 501 Or Similar)

0.46

14

1 Summer Dress in a Chain Store (Zara, H&M, ...)

0.62

15

1 Pair of Nike Shoes

0.64

16

1 Pair of Men Leather Shoes

0.51

17

Apples (1kg)

0.52

18

Oranges (1kg)

0.45

19

Potato (1kg)

0.30

20

Lettuce (1 head)

0.41

21

Rice (white), (1kg)

0.44

22

Tomato (1kg)

0.27
Notes: Traded-input shares represent the estimated values.
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Table A.2 - Cities in the Micro Price Data
City

City

City

City

City

City

City

City

City

Aachen, Germany

Bhopal, India

Cologne, Germany

Grenoble, France

Kota Kinabalu, Malaysia

Milton Keynes, United Kingdom

Phnom Penh, Cambodia

Sao Jose dos Campos, Brazil

Tunis, Tunisia

Aalborg, Denmark

Bhubenswar, India

Colombo, Sri Lanka

Groningen, Netherlands

Kowloon, Hong Kong

Milwaukee, WI, United States

Phoenix, AZ, United States

Sao Paulo, Brazil

Turin, Italy

Abbotsford, Canada

Bialystok, Poland

Columbus, OH, United States

Guadalajara, Mexico

Krakow (Cracow), Poland

Minneapolis, MN, United States

Phuket, Thailand

Sarajevo, Bosnia And Herzegovina

Turku, Finland

Aberdeen, United Kingdom

Bilbao, Spain

Copenhagen, Denmark

Guangzhou, China

Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia

Minsk, Belarus

Pittsburgh, PA, United States

Saskatoon, Canada

Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia

Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates

Birmingham, United Kingdom

Cork, Ireland

Guatemala City, Guatemala

Kuching, Malaysia

Mississauga, Canada

Plovdiv, Bulgaria

Seattle, WA, United States

Utrecht, Netherlands

Accra, Ghana

Bogota, Colombia

Coventry, United Kingdom

Guildford, United Kingdom

Kuwait City, Kuwait

Monterrey, Mexico

Port Elizabeth, South Africa

Seoul, South Korea

Vadodara, India

Ad Dammam, Saudi Arabia

Boise, ID, United States

Cuenca, Ecuador

Gurgaon, India

Lagos, Nigeria

Montevideo, Uruguay

Portland, OR, United States

Sevilla, Spain

Valencia, Spain

Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

Bologna, Italy

Curitiba, Brazil

Haifa, Israel

Lahore, Pakistan

Montreal, Canada

Porto Alegre, Brazil

Shanghai, China

Vancouver, Canada

Adelaide, Australia

Bordeaux, France

Dallas, TX, United States

Halifax, Canada

Larnaca, Cyprus

Moscow, Russia

Porto, Portugal

Sharjah, United Arab Emirates

Varna, Bulgaria

Ahmedabad, India

Boston, MA, United States

Damascus, Syria

Hamburg, Germany

Las Vegas, NV, United States

Mumbai, India

Poznan, Poland

Shenzhen, China

Venice, Italy

Akron, OH, United States

Brampton, Canada

Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania

Hamilton, Canada

Lausanne, Switzerland

Munich, Germany

Prague, Czech Republic

Shiraz, Iran

Verona, Italy

Albuquerque, NM, United States

Brasilia, Brazil

Darwin, Australia

Hanoi, Vietnam

Leeds, United Kingdom

Muscat, Oman

Pretoria, South Africa

Singapore, Singapore

Vicenza, Italy

Alexandria, Egypt

Brasov, Romania

Davao, Philippines

Harare, Zimbabwe

Leicester, United Kingdom

Nagpur, India

Pristina, Serbia

Skopje, Macedonia

Victoria, Canada

Algiers, Algeria

Bratislava, Slovakia

Delhi, India

Hartford, CT, United States

Leiden, Netherlands

Nairobi, Kenya

Puerto Vallarta, Mexico

Sliema, Malta

Vienna, Austria

Alicante, Spain

Brighton, United Kingdom

Denver, CO, United States

Helsinki, Finland

Lille, France

Nanaimo, BC, Canada

Pune, India

Sofia, Bulgaria

Vilnius, Lithuania

Almaty, Kazakhstan

Brisbane, Australia

Detroit, MI, United States

Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam

Lima, Peru

Naples, Italy

Punta del Este, Uruguay

Split, Croatia

Visakhapatnam, India

Amman, Jordan

Bristol, United Kingdom

Dhaka, Bangladesh

Hobart, Australia

Limassol, Cyprus

Nashville, TN, United States

Quebec City, Canada

Spokane, WA, United States

Vladivostok, Russia

Amsterdam, Netherlands

Brno, Czech Republic

Dnipropetrovsk, Ukraine

Hong Kong, Hong Kong

Lisbon, Portugal

Nasik, India

Quezon City, Philippines

Stavanger, Norway

Warsaw, Poland

Anchorage, AK, United States

Brussels, Belgium

Doha, Qatar

Honolulu, HI, United States

Liverpool, United Kingdom

Navi Mumbai, India

Quito, Ecuador

Stockholm, Sweden

Washington, DC, United States

Ankara, Turkey

Bucharest, Romania

Donetsk, Ukraine

Houston, TX, United States

Ljubljana, Slovenia

New Orleans, LA, United States

Raleigh, NC, United States

Strasbourg, France

Waterloo, Canada

Antalya, Turkey

Budapest, Hungary

Dresden, Germany

Huntsville, AL, United States

Lodz, Poland

New York, NY, United States

Reading, United Kingdom

Stuttgart, Germany

Wellington, New Zealand

Antwerp, Belgium

Buenos Aires, Argentina

Dubai, United Arab Emirates

Hyderabad, India

London, Canada

Newcastle Upon Tyne, United Kingdom

Recife, Brazil

Surabaya, Indonesia

West Palm Beach, FL, United States

Arhus, Denmark

Buffalo, NY, United States

Dublin, Ireland

Iasi, Romania

London, United Kingdom

Nice, France

Regina, Canada

Surat, India

Wichita, KS, United States

Asheville, NC, United States

Bursa, Turkey

Dunedin, New Zealand

Nicosia, Cyprus

Reno, NV, United States

Surrey, Canada

Windhoek, Namibia

Athens, Greece

Busan, South Korea

Durban, South Africa

Indore, India

Louisville, KY, United States

Nis, Serbia

Reykjavik, Iceland

Sydney, Australia

Windsor, Canada

Atlanta, GA, United States

Bydgoszcz, Poland

Dusseldorf, Germany

Irbil, Iraq

Luanda, Angola

Nizhniy Novgorod, Russia

Richmond, VA, United States

Szczecin, Poland

Winnipeg, Canada

Auckland, New Zealand

Cairns, Australia

Edinburgh, United Kingdom

Islamabad, Pakistan

Lublin, Poland

Noida, India

Riga, Latvia

Taichung, Taiwan

Wroclaw, Poland

Austin, TX, United States

Cairo, Egypt

Edmonton, Canada

Istanbul, Turkey

Ludhiana, India

Nottingham, United Kingdom

Rijeka, Croatia

Taipei, Taiwan

Yangon, Myanmar
Yekaterinburg, Russia

Indianapolis, IN, United States Los Angeles, CA, United States

Baghdad, Iraq

Calgary, Canada

Eindhoven, Netherlands

Izmir, Turkey

Lugano, Switzerland

Novi Sad, Serbia

Rio De Janeiro, Brazil

Tallinn, Estonia

Bahrain, Bahrain

Cambridge, United Kingdom

Esfahan, Iran

Jacksonville, FL, United States

Luxembourg, Luxembourg

Novosibirsk, Russia

Riyadh, Saudi Arabia

Tampa, FL, United States

Yerevan, Armenia

Baku, Azerbaijan

Campinas, Brazil

Espoo, Finland

Jaipur, India

Lviv, Ukraine

Nuremberg, Germany

Roanoke, VA, United States

Tampere, Finland

Yogyakarta, Indonesia

Bali, Indonesia

Canberra, Australia

Florence, Italy

Jakarta, Indonesia

Lyon, France

Odesa, Ukraine

Rochester, NY, United States

Tartu, Estonia

Zagreb, Croatia

Baltimore, MD, United States

Cancun, Mexico

Florianopolis, Brazil

Jeddah (Jiddah), Saudi Arabia

Macao, Macao

Oklahoma City, OK, United States

Rome, Italy

Tashkent, Uzbekistan

Zurich, Switzerland

Bandung, Indonesia

Cape Town, South Africa

Fort Lauderdale, FL, United States

Jerusalem, Israel

Madison, WI, United States

Omaha, NE, United States

Rostov-na-donu, Russia

Tbilisi, Georgia

Bangalore, India

Caracas, Venezuela

Fort Worth, TX, United States

Johannesburg, South Africa

Madrid, Spain

Orlando, FL, United States

Rotterdam, Netherlands

Tehran, Iran

Bangkok, Thailand

Cardiff, United Kingdom

Fortaleza, Brazil

Johor Baharu, Malaysia

Makati, Philippines

Osaka, Japan

Sacramento, CA, United States

Tel Aviv-Yafo, Israel

Banja Luka, Bosnia And Herzegovina

Casablanca, Morocco

Frankfurt, Germany

Kampala, Uganda

Malaga, Spain

Osijek, Croatia

Saint Louis, MO, United States

Thane, India

Barcelona, Spain

Cebu, Philippines

Fredericton, Canada

Kansas City, MO, United States

Malmo, Sweden

Oslo, Norway

Saint Petersburg, Russia

The Hague, Netherlands

Barrie, Canada

Chandigarh, India

Gaborone, Botswana

Karachi, Pakistan

Manama, Bahrain

Ottawa, Canada

Salt Lake City, UT, United States

Thessaloniki, Greece

Basel, Switzerland

Charlotte, NC, United States

Galway, Ireland

Kathmandu, Nepal

Manchester, United Kingdom

Oxford, United Kingdom

Salvador, Brazil

Thiruvananthapuram, India

Beersheba, Israel

Chennai, India

Gdansk, Poland

Katowice, Poland

Manila, Philippines

Padova, Italy

San Antonio, TX, United States

Timisoara, Romania

Beijing, China

Chiang Mai, Thailand

Geneva, Switzerland

Kaunas, Lithuania

Maribor, Slovenia

Panama City, Panama

San Diego, CA, United States

Tirana, Albania

Beirut, Lebanon

Chicago, IL, United States

Genoa, Italy

Kelowna, Canada

Marseille, France

Paphos, Cyprus

San Francisco, CA, United States

Tokyo, Japan

Belfast, United Kingdom

Chisinau, Moldova

Gent, Belgium

Kharkiv, Ukraine

Medellin, Colombia

Paris, France

San Jose, CA, United States

Tomsk, Russia

Belgrade, Serbia

Christchurch, New Zealand

Glasgow, United Kingdom

Khartoum, Sudan

Melbourne, Australia

Patras, Greece

San Jose, Costa Rica

Toronto, Canada

Belo Horizonte, Brazil

Cincinnati, OH, United States

Goa, India

Kiev, Ukraine

Memphis, TN, United States

Pattaya, Thailand

San Juan, Puerto Rico

Toulouse, France

Bergamo, Italy

Cleveland, OH, United States

Goiania, Brazil

Kingston, Jamaica

Merida, Mexico

Penang, Malaysia

San Salvador, El Salvador

Trieste, Italy

Bergen, Norway

Cluj-napoca, Romania

Gold Coast, Australia

Kitchener, Canada

Mexico City, Mexico

Perth, Australia

Santa Barbara, CA, United States

Tripoli, Libya

Berlin, Germany

Coimbatore, India

Gothenburg, Sweden

Kochi, India

Miami, FL, United States

Petaling Jaya, Malaysia

Santiago, Chile

Trondheim, Norway

Bern, Switzerland

Coimbra, Portugal

Graz, Austria

Kolkata, India

Milan, Italy

Philadelphia, PA, United States

Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic

Tucson, AZ, United States

